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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT REEDY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950638-CA 
Priority No. 2 
In response to the issues raised in Appellant Robert Reedy's 
brief on appeal, the state argues the trial court and state were 
not required to provide Robert Reedy ("Reedy") with timely 
service of papers initiating probation-revocation proceedings, in 
order for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the matter. 
Yet the plain language of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (1992) require the state and the 
trial court to provide such service without exception and without 
delay. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in order to be 
timely, a probationer must be served with the relevant papers 
before the original expiration of his probation period. Other-
wise, the trial court may not retain jurisdiction over the 
matter. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 794 (Utah 1990). 
The state's argument, as set forth in the Brief of Appellee 
("S.B."), disregards the plain language of the probation-
revocation statute, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
relevant case law. 
In this appeal, Reedy is asking this Court to reverse the 
ruling of the trial court, and affirm the determination that the 
state and/or trial court must serve the probationer with a copy 
of the papers initiating the revocation proceedings prior to the 
expiration of the probation period in order for the trial court 
to retain jurisdiction over the probationer. Such a determination 
is consistent with Utah statutory and case law and the due 
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE ESSENTIALLY IS ASKING THIS COURT TO DISREGARD THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH CODE AND RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, AND TO ABANDON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBA-
TION-REVOCATION STATUTE THAT IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN UTAH 
CASE LAW AND CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS, 
In this case, neither the state nor the trial court gave 
notice to Reedy prior to the expiration of his probation period 
that revocation proceedings had been commenced. (Record on 
Appeal (l!R.,f) 44-48, 53.) In May 1992, Reedy was sentenced to 18 
months probation. (R. 173-74.) His probation was scheduled to 
expire by its terms in November 1993. In June 1993, Adult Pro-
bation and Parole (hereinafter "AP&P" and/or "state") filed a 
violations report and affidavit alleging Reedy had "gone to 
California with his father," and had failed to obtain a "Travel 
Permit to leave the State of Utah." (R. 44, 47-48.) The report 
and affidavit were not served on Reedy or his counsel of record, 
Ken Brown. (R. 44-48, 53.) 
Thereafter, in June 1993, the trial court entered an order 
to show cause why Reedy's probation should not be revoked and 
issued a warrant for his arrest. (R. 45-46, 53.) Neither the 
state nor the trial court served those papers on Reedy or his 
counsel at any time prior to November 1993, the date his 
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probation term was originally scheduled to expire. Almost two 
years after they were filed, Reedy was served with the papers 
initiating the probation-revocation proceedings. (R. 45-46.) 
Reedy's probation period should have been allowed to expire 
in November 1993. At the time notice of the proceedings was 
provided to Reedy, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the matter. 
A. THE 1992 VERSION OF THE PROBATION-REVOCATION STATUTE AND 
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT AND 
STATE TO SERVE THE PROBATIONER WITH PAPERS INITIATING 
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS. 
The state claims that serving a probationer with papers 
initiating revocation proceedings prior to expiration of the 
probation period is not a condition that must be met under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1992) in order for the trial court to retain 
jurisdiction over the probationer. (S.B. at 6-8.) Like the 
current version of the probation-revocation statute, the 1992 
version provides the following: 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled 
upon the filing of a violation report with the court 
alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(9) (1992). According to the state, the "tolling" provision 
of the statute compels the determination that the mere filing of 
the papers initiating the proceedings tolls the probation period. 
Yet the probation-revocation statute also provides for notice: 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging 
with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
that authorized probation shall determine if the 
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affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that 
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable 
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a 
warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and 
an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(10) (1992) (emphasis added). 
The "tolling" provision1 and the "service" provision2 
cannot be read in isolation, but must be read as part of the 
whole statute. This Court has stated, "[O]ne of the fundamental 
rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in light of the general purpose it was 
intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to 
accomplish that objective." State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 
(Utah 1965)); see also Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 916 
P.2d 344 (Utah 1996) ("[a] general rule of statutory construction 
is that a statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole") 
(quoting Zissi v. State Tax Com'n, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah 
1992)). The statute requires the state and/or the trial court to 
serve the requisite papers, initiating the proceedings, on the 
probationer in order to properly commence revocation proceedings 
for the purpose of retaining jurisdiction over the probationer. 
Stated another way, while the statute requires the filing of 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (Supp. 1995) ; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(9) (1992). 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (b) (ii) (Supp. 1995) ; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(10)(b)(ii) (1992). 
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a violation report or the issuance of the order to show cause 
and/or warrant to begin the tolling process, logically that 
process is only complete when the trial court has "cause[d] to be 
serve[d] on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of 
the affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should 
not be revoked, modified, or extended." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(10)(b)(ii) (1992). The provisions of the same statute must be 
read together to make sense. 
Consider the logical progression of things as set forth in 
the statute. It requires filing of violation papers, either a 
violation report or an "affidavit alleging with particularity 
facts asserted to constitute a violation of the conditions of 
probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(b)(i) (1992). Next, 
the statute requires the court to "determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, 
modification, or extension of probation is justified." Id. at 
(10)(b)(i). Once that has been determined, the statute then 
contemplates issuance by the court of a warrant for the 
probationer's arrest or issuance of the order to show cause, and 
service of those papers on the probationer. Id. at (10)(b)(ii). 
"Service" is included in the provision that contemplates the 
trial court will "determin[e] probable cause" to issue the very 
papers, id. at (10)(b)(ii), that must be "filed" to trigger 
tolling, id. at (9). The provisions are intertwined. They 
are meant to work together and compliment each other. Thus, 
tolling takes place only after the trial court has caused the 
necessary papers to be served. A statute should be read to 
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harmonize with its related law. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 468 (Utah 1988); State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 
App. 1992). In this instance, the "related law" is Section 77-18-
1 taken as a whole, and case law interpreting the provisions of 
the statute, as set forth in Section B, below. 
In addition, the plain language of Rule 3, Utah R. Crim. P., 
requires timely service of the requisite papers: 
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall be 
filed with the court and served on all other parties. 
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 
shall be made upon the attorneyt unless service upon the 
party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner 
provided in civil actions. 
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution 
by the court, mail to each party a copy thereof and certify 
to the court such mailing. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 3 (1996) (emphasis added). The Rule contem-
plates that service and filing will take place simultaneously. 
Under those provisions, neither the state nor trial court were 
relieved of the obligation to serve the relevant papers on Reedy 
and counsel when the papers were filed with the trial court. 
B. UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE CONSTRUED THE "SERVICE" 
PROVISION OF THE PROBATION-REVOCATION STATUTE TO MANDATE THE 
TRIAL COURT TO SERVE THE PAPERS INITIATING REVOCATION 
PROCEEDINGS ON THE PROBATIONER IN A TIMELY MANNER, THAT IS, 
PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROBATION PERIOD. 
In Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court considered a "service" provision like that set forth in the 
1992 version of the statute, see note 2, supra, and interpreted 
the provision to require the trial court to provide notice, prior 
to expiration of the probation term, to the probationer of 
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various filings initiating the revocation proceedings in order 
for the court to retain jurisdiction over the matter. The court 
stated, "The probationer must be served with the order to show 
cause within the period of probation." Smith, 803 P.2d at 794. 
Like the 1992 version of the probation-revocation statute, the 
statute in Smith emphasized the need to provide notice to the 
probationer, where the papers required to be served were also 
required to inform the probationer of the nature of the 
allegations against him and his right to counsel and to present 
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(b) and (c) (1992). 
[Sjection 77-18-1 (Supp.1981) does place a significant 
amount of emphasis on the nature and degree of notice to 
which an individual is entitled prior to a revocation 
hearing. Section 77-18-1 (5) (b) and (c) (Supp.1981) not only 
states that a court "shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a copy of the affidavit and order to show cause," 
but also provides that the order to show cause shall inform 
the defendant of the nature of the accusations against him, 
his right to counsel, and his right to present evidence. [] 
The emphasis on notice in section 77-18-1 (Supp.1981) is 
consistent with the assertion that a court retains the 
authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served 
with notice of the revocation proceedings within the 
probation period. 
Smith, 803 P.2d at 795-96 (footnotes omitted). The court's 
decision in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988), is in 
accord. 
The state finds Smith to be unpersuasive because it was 
decided in connection with a 1981 version of the statute that did 
not include the specific "tolling" provision contained in the 
1992 version of the statute. Smith, 803 P.2d at 796 n. 40; (S.B. 
at 7-8) . According to the state, because the "tolling" provision 
provides a mechanism for postponing the expiration of a probation 
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period, the holding in Smith construing the "service" provision 
to mandate such service within the probation period is 
inapplicable. The state's interpretation of Section 77-18-1 
disregards the fact that the current and 1992 versions of the 
probation-revocation statute specifically retain the "service" 
provision of the previous version of the statute. In addition, 
as set forth above, the plain language of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure mandate timely service. Utah R. Crim. P. 3. 
The state's interpretation of the statute would permit the 
trial court and state to delay providing notice indefinitely to 
the probationer of the revocation proceedings. According to the 
state, there is no obligation to inform probationer or his 
counsel of the initiation of the proceedings within any specified 
period of time so long as the relevant papers simply have been 
filed with the court. The state's interpretation of the statute 
has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court: the failure 
indefinitely to provide notice to probationer of the initiation 
of revocation proceedings is improper. 
The assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice 
within the period of probation in order for the court to 
retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent with 
the rationale underlying our decision in Green. If 
probationers are given notice within the probation period, 
there is no danger of placing them "in a state of perpetual 
limbo[, where] although their probation would appear to have 
terminated ... defendants would actually be subject to a 
continued term of fictional supervision." [] Under such an 
approach, all parties concerned would be aware of the 
proceedings and the allegations underlying the proceedings 
at the time the probation terminates. Probationers could 
also be assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under 
different grounds could be brought against them once the 
probation period has ended. [] Therefore, probationers 
would not be in a state of limbo where it would appear that 
their probation had terminated but where further proceedings 
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could be brought against them. However, if a trial court was 
able to retain authority to revoke probation without giving 
notice to the probationer, there may be situations in which 
it could appear that probation had ended when in fact the 
court may, at some later date, reassert its jurisdiction 
over the defendant for the purpose of revoking probation. 
Smith, 803 P.2d at 793-94 (quoting Green, 757 P.2d at 464). 
In its brief, the state has not denied that it failed to 
provide timely notice to Reedy of the initiation of the 
revocation proceedings. The state fails to explain why it failed 
to serve Reedy's counsel with the papers pursuant to Rule 3(a) 
and (b), Utah R. Crim. P., and with the Order to Show Cause "upon 
execution by the court," as mandated by Rule 3(c). The trial 
court and state's failure to serve the requisite papers on Reedy 
and his counsel prior to expiration of the probation period 
resulted in a termination of the trial court's jurisdiction over 
Reedy. The trial court erred in proceeding with the matter two 
years later. 
C. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE "SERVICE" 
PROVISION OF THE STATUTE COMPORTS WITH DUE PROCESS CONCERNS. 
Section 77-18-1 and relevant case law are not the only 
authority mandating that notice of revocation proceedings be 
provided to a probationer in order for the trial court to retain 
jurisdiction over probation proceedings. The courts in Smith, 
Green, and State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), have emphasized due process concerns where notice has not 
been timely provided. The state has failed to address such 
constitutional concerns except to say that, the "tolling" 
provision in the 1992 version of the statute applies so as to 
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extend indefinitely the time in which the state and/or trial 
court is required to provide notice of the proceedings to Reedy 
and counsel. Thus, since expiration of the probation period is 
tolled, notice may be provided at any time. But see Smith, 803 
P.2d at 793-94 ("If probationers are given notice within the 
probation period, there is no danger of placing them 'in a state 
of perpetual limbo[, where] although their probation would appear 
to have terminated ... defendants would actually be subject to a 
continued term of fictional supervision'") (quoting Green, 757 
P.2d at 464). 
The state disregards the fundamental fairness and due 
process concerns implicated when parties are not provided with 
adequate and timely notice of proceedings. The state's 
interpretation of the probation-revocation statute would render 
it unconstitutional, with seemingly no requirement that 
probationers be given timely notice, as that has been defined in 
Smith, of revocation proceedings. 
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard 
in a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural 
fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 
1983) (citations omitted); accord Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 
734, 743 (Utah 1990); W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 
802 P.2d 755, 761 (Utah App.1990). "[A]11 parties are 
entitled to notice that a particular issue is being 
considered by a court and to an opportunity to present 
evidence and argument on that issue before decision." 
Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743. A defendant may be denied his or 
her right to due process under article I, section 7, of the 
Utah Constitution if adequate notice has not been given. 
Id.; see also Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (notice is "'[a]n 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process'") 
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950))."' 
"Many cases have held that where notice is ambiguous or 
inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the 
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proceedings against him [or her] or not given sufficiently 
in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party-
is deprived of due process."/n Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743 
(quoting Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212) ) ; accord W. & G. 
Co., 802 P.2d at 762. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069. Furthermore, 
The probationer's right to notice is necessary because "all 
parties concerned would be aware of the proceedings ... at 
the time the probation terminates. Probationers could also 
be assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under 
different grounds could be brought against them once the 
probation period has ended." [Smith 803 P.2d] at 795 
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, the [Smith] court felt 
that its holding was appropriate because it "guarantee[d] 
the fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause 
of the United States Constitution [which] entitle [s] 
probationers to written notice of the accusations against 
them." Id. at 795. Even though revocation proceedings 
were commenced well before the expiration of probation, 
because the plaintiff was not given notice of the revocation 
proceedings before the probation period expired, the court 
held that the trial court lacked the authority to revoke the 
plaintiff's probation and his petition for habeas corpus was 
granted. Id. at 796. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1068-69. Statutes must be construed to comply 
with constitutional framework. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 
(Utah 1989); see also State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 
1995); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). 
Courts should construe statutory provisions to avoid uncon-
stitutional application of the statute, and will look to 
definitions of terms and phrases in other decisions in construing 
the statute. Strawberry Electric Service Dist. v. Spanish Fork 
City, 918 P.2d 870, 876-77 (Utah 1996). 
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the "service" 
provision of the probation-revocation statute accommodates con-
stitutional concerns. Smith, 803 P.2d at 794. The legislature 
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and the Utah appellate courts consistently have found a 
requirement that the state and trial courts provide timely notice 
to the probationer that revocation proceedings have been 
initiated. Utah courts have consistently ruled that the 
"service" provision mandates the provision of notice prior to 
expiration of the original probation term in order for the trial 
court to maintain jurisdiction over the probationer. Id. The 
requirement of notice prior to expiration of the probation period 
affords timely notice and conforms to constitutional concerns. 
Here, neither Reedy nor his counsel was provided with timely 
service of the relevant papers, where the papers were served on 
Reedy 18 months after his original probation period expired, 
almost two years after they were filed. The state does not 
suggest that providing notice to Reedy or his counsel would have 
been difficult, impractical or an impossibility. Although the 
state asserts "Reedy absconded to California" (S.B. at 9), there 
is no evidence in the record that would suggest he was "actively-
evading supervision," Smith, 803 P.2d 794, which suggests more 
than making a trip to California for the small children of his 
recently deceased brother. Rather, his supervisors were apprised 
of his whereabouts (R. 44 (violations report reflects: "defendant 
had gone to California with his father")), and all parties, 
including the trial court and state, were aware Reedy was 
represented by counsel (R. 44), who was available to receive 
service of relevant filings. 
The state offers no explanation for its failure to comply 
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with Rule 3, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires 
parties to serve an attorney who is representing a party with 
"[a]11 motions, notices and pleadings," and to "mail to each 
party" a copy of an order, including an order to show cause, 
"upon execution" of that order; and the clear language of Section 
77-18-1, which provides that upon finding probable cause to issue 
the order to show cause and/or warrant, the trial court "shall 
cause to be served on the defendant" the relevant papers. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (1992); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 4 
(1996) (allows warrants and summons for arrest to be "mail[ed] to 
the defendant's last known address" upon execution). 
Neither the trial court nor the state were relieved of the 
obligation to provide timely notice within the probation period 
to Reedy or his counsel concerning commencement of the probation-
revocation proceedings. The trial court erred in proceeding with 
the revocation proceedings in 1995 where it lacked jurisdiction 
to consider the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Reedy respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the final order and declare the revocation 
proceedings null and void since the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to revoke Reedy's probation. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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